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INTERROGATION OF DETAINEES: EXTENDING A
HAND ORA BOOT?
Amos N. Guiora*
The current "war on terror" provides the Bush administration with a unique op-
portunity to both establish clear guidelines for the interrogation of detainees and to
make a forceful statement about American values. How the government chooses to
act can promote either an ethical commitment to the norms of civil society, or an
attitude analogous to Toby Keith's "American Way," where Keith sings that
"you'll be sorry that you messed with the USofA, 'Cuz we'll put a boot in your ass,
It's the American Way."
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. Served for nine-
teen years in the Israel Defense Forces, Judge Advocate General Corps; held senior
command positions including Legal Advisor to the Gaza Strip Military Commander, Judge
Advocate for the Navy, and Home Front Command and Commandant, IDF School of Mili-
tary Law. The author's previous publications on this topic include: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
COUNTERTERRORISM, A CASEBOOK, Aspen Publishers (2007); with Martha Minow, National
Objectives in the Hands of Junior Leaders, in COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE
21ST CENTURY 235 (James J.F. Forest ed., 2007); Terrorism Bombing, in INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. forthcoming); CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COER-
CIVE INTERROGATION (OUP, forthcoming 2008); Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid
Paradigm for Detaining Terrorists, 19 FLA.J. INT'L L. 2 (forthcoming 2008); Where are Terrorists to
be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 805
(2007); TERRORISM PRIMER (forthcoming 2008). In addition, the Israel Supreme Court,
sitting as the High Court of Justice, cited my article Targeted Killing as Active Setf-Defense, 36
CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. 319 (2004) in its ruling, 769/02, on December 13, 2006. I owe many
people an enormous debt of gratitude for this Article, which is part of a larger project re-
lated to the limits of interrogation. Many thanks to Professor Gerald Korngold of Case
School of Law for urging me to undertake this Article, then actively encouraging its writ-
ing and reading an earlier draft; my Case colleagues: Professors Melvin Durchslag, Jonathan
Entin, Paul Giannelli, Lewis Katz, and Bob Strassfeld, all of whom so graciously helped me
frame the issues relevant to their fields of expertise; Professor Phil Heymann of the Harvard
Law School who not only read an earlier draft of the Article but participated in formulating
its parameters; Professor David Luban of the Georgetown Law School whose comments to
an earlier draft were remarkable both in their speed and wisdom; Professor Craig Nard of
the Case Law School whose comments on an earlier draft helped sharpen the arguments;
faculty and students at the following law schools that so generously provided me a forum to
present and test my thesis: Case Western Reserve, George Mason, George Washington, Har-
vard, Stanford, Utah, and Washington University, their critical and candid comments were
of enormous importance in forcing me to defend my thesis; Institute for Global Security
Research Fellow, Brian Field (Case Law '07) and Institute Senior Fellow and Presidential
Management Fellow, Erin Page (Case Law '06) who spent untold hours researching, editing,
and arguing with me every step of the way. This Article is truly a labor of their remarkable
efforts. The Article is dedicated to two extraordinary mentors and friends: Professor Korn-
gold for truly being there throughout the process and Professor Martha Minow of the
Harvard Law School, who not only was "present at the creation" of this Article but nurtured
its progress at all stages. Professor Minow and Professor Korngold represent the very best in
mentoring, criticizing, and facilitating a colleague's work. They are the academic ideal.
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No aspect of the "war on terror" more clearly addresses this balance than coercive
interrogation. In a recent decision, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the United States Su-
preme Court found the procedures governing the Guantanamo Bay Military
Commissions to be inadequate. Though the Court called on the Administration to
create appropriate procedures and processes, the recently enacted Military Commis-
sions Act and the subsequently issued Department of Defense Manual for the Trial
of Detainees suggest that the Administration has not fully internalized Hamdan 's
significance regarding the coercive interrogation of detainees.
In seeking a clear articulation of interrogation standards, this Article turns to the
pages ofAmerican history for guidance. Drawing a comparison between the cur-
rent detainees and African Americans in the Deep South, this historical analysis
argues that the same constitutionally based protections against coercive interroga-
tion of African Americans can and should be extended to the detainees, a
currently unprotected class.
This historical analogy is accomplished by analyzing a set of cases termed the
Braim-Brown progeny. This watershed line of cases shows the Supreme Court's
willingness to enter the interrogation context in the Deep South, where the Court
eventually mandated the extension of constitutional protections to an unprotected
class of people.
This Article concludes by formulating recommendations based on constitutional,
criminal, and international law that the author posits will both cure the deficien-
cies identified by the Court in Hamdan and provide a means for the United States
to return to its moral stance in the international community.
You'll be sorry that you messed with the USofA,
'Cuz we'll put a boot in your ass,
It ' the American Way.
-"Courtesy of the Red, White, & Blue"
by Toby Keith
INTRODUCTION
Post 9/11, the United States has the opportunity to send a mes-
sage to the rest of the world. The message can be either that of
Keith's "American Way," or of a commitment to an ethical and
moral approach of extending the norms of civil society. In the cur-
rent "war on terror," an unfettered executive has refused to
articulate standards and limits for coercive interrogation, commu-
nicating to the international community a message analogous to
Keith's "American Way." The United States Supreme Court entered
this debate in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,1 a watershed executive power
1. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
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case. This Article argues that Hamdan can be viewed as the natural
heir to the Bram-Brown progeny,2 and that valuable lessons learned
from the African American experience in the Deep South can and
should be applied to the current detainee interrogation context.
As discussed below, the Bram-Brown progeny is a set of cases, origi-
nating with Bram v. United States, which outlined the establishment
of protections in the interrogation setting.3
Five years after 9/11, there remains a lack of adequate standards
for the interrogation 4 of those detained in this "armed conflict
short of war."5 To fill this void, a wide spectrum of possible interro-
gation standards exist, permitting harsh interrogations or torture6
at one extreme and granting either full Geneva Convention or
domestic criminal law protections at the other.
Given the panoply of options between these two extremes, it is
necessary to precisely and conclusively delineate a clear set of stan-
dards and procedures for detainee interrogations. The extensive
scholarship focused on torture,7 while provocative and interesting,
forms only a small facet of the interrogation inquiry. The broader
2. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brown v. United States, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
3. See infa Part 11.
4. Defined as the application of force, either physical or mental, in order to extract
information. Coercive interrogation can range from mild to extreme, but somewhere along
that spectrum coercive interrogation morphs into actions more commonly considered to be
torture. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal, 104 MICH.
L. REv. 671, 672-73 (2006).
5. The Israeli Government created this term to address the nebulous type of conflict
which is not quite war and not quite a police action; in this Article it will be used to refer to
the post 9/11 conflict generally. See Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sharm EI-Sheikh Fact-
Finding Committee: First Statement of the Government of Israel (Dec. 28, 2000), http://
www.mfa.gov.il/NR/exeres/FCFDA57E-15AB-4F50-AFBD-BDCE6A289FA8.htm.
6. Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales,
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRtrH (2004).
7. See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Response to Professor Strauss, 48
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 275 (2003-2004) (advocating the so-called torture warrant). See generally
Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in
Which Torture is MorallyJustified, 39 U.S.E L. REv. 581 (2005) (arguing that torture is morally
defensible in circumstances where more grave harm can be avoided); David E. Graham, The
Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 61 (2005) (dis-
cussing the principal legal issues associated with the treatment and interrogation of
Prisoners of War and detainees); Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, The Unholy Trinity: Intelli-
gence, Interrogation, and Torture, 37 CASE W. REs.J. INT'L L. REV. 427 (2006); KennethJ. Levit,
The CIA and the Torture Controversy: Interrogation Authorities and Practices in the War on Terror, 1 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 341 (2005); Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 275 (1994) (tracing the development and draft-
ing of the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment); Phillip N.S. Rumney, Is Coercive Interrogation of Terrorist Suspects
Effective? A Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. REv. 479 (2006) (considering if coer-
cive interrogation works in producing timely, reliable and life-saving information).
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question of what interrogation methods are permissible beyond
the clich6 "ticking time-bomb" hypothetical is the more important
issue.
This Article argues that allowing an unfettered executive to con-
tinue to promulgate loose standards offends civil society and
international law and decreases the likelihood of an international
coalition assisting the United States in the "war on terror." In ascer-
taining the necessary new limits, the Article will examine, and then
meld, various aspects of the domestic criminal law paradigm with
the prisoner of war paradigm in order to create a hybrid model.
The criminal law paradigm is "all that is involved in the administra-
tion of criminal justice, in the broadest sense, [embracing] ...
substantive criminal law, criminal procedure, and special problems
in the administration and enforcement of criminal justice."" The
hybrid paradigm is not exclusively a criminal law paradigm or a
prisoner of war ("POW") paradigm, but is in equilibrium between
the laws pertaining to domestic criminals and those pertaining to
POWs; it is a melding of these other two models.9 The conclusions
of this Article are premised upon the assumption that the hybrid
paradigm is the most appropriate legal and policy framework to
apply to the current detainee situation.
The arguments this Article makes for superimposing aspects of
the criminal law paradigm onto the hybrid paradigm should not be
confused with a broader claim that non-citizen detainees are in-
herently entitled to constitutional rights. Rather, the Article
recommends the extension of some constitutional protections to
detainees as the best way to remedy deficiencies in the current sys-
tem. This proposal aims to balance the need for interrogations as a
means of pursuing legitimate national security considerations
against an individual's interest in his or her own physical auton-
10
omy.
This Article's hybrid model will be created by taking criminal law
protections that were extended by the Supreme Court to African
8. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1, 6 (3d ed. 1982).
9. Specifically, the hybrid paradigm is "a true mix of both the criminal law and pris-
oner of war paradigms without [either] full constitutional or criminal procedure rights." See
Amos N. Guiora, Quirin to Hamdan: Creating a Hybrid Paradigm for the Detention of Terrorists, 19
FLA.J. INT'L L. 2 (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Quirin to Hamdin]; Amos N. Guiora, Where
are Terrorists to be Tried: A Comparative Analysis of Rights Granted to Suspected Terrorists, 56 CATH.
U. L. REV. 805 (2007) [hereinafter Where are Terrorists to be Tried].
10. See Stephan Dycus, The Role of Military Intelligence in Homeland Security, 64 LA. L. REv.
779 (2004); Amos N. Guiora, Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing Competing Inter-
ests in Counter-Terrorism, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. LJ. 363 (2006) (regarding comparative
analysis of balancing approaches); Deborah Ramirez & Stephanie Woldenberg, Balancing
Security and Liberty in a Post-September 1 1th World: The Search for Common Sense in Domestic Coun-
terterrorism Policy, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 495 (2005).
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Americans in the Deep South1 throughout the last century and
superimposing them on the current detainee situation.
This hybrid model takes on particular importance in the after-
math of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld12 In Hamdan, the Supreme Court
signaled to the Bush Administration that the procedures governing
the Guantanamo Bay military commissions were inadequate and
demanded a reformulation of procedures and processes for the
military commissions. 3 Among other things, the commission's pro-
cedures provide "that an accused and his civilian counsel may be
excluded from, and precluded from ever learning what evidence
was presented during, any part of the proceeding" that the com-
mission chooses to close.' 4 Grounds for such closure include:
[T]he protection of classified information, the physical safety
of participants and witnesses, the protection of intelligence
and law enforcement sources, methods or activities, and
"other national security interests." Appointed military defense
counsel must be privy to these closed sessions, but may, at the
presiding officers discretion, be forbidden to reveal to the cli-
ent what took place.... Moreover, the accused and his civilian
counsel may be denied access to classified and other "pro-
tected information," so long as the presiding officer
concludes that the evidence is 'probative. ' 5
In further analyzing these deficiencies, the Court held that even
assuming that Hamdan is a dangerous individual who would cause
great harm or death to innocent civilians given the opportunity,
the Executive nevertheless must comply with the prevailing rule of
law in undertaking to try him and subject him to criminal punish-
ment.16
In response to Hamdan, the United States Congress passed the
Military Commissions Act of 2006.17 While this Congressional ac-
tion was a step in the direction of addressing the Court's concerns
in Hamdan, it is ultimately insufficient to ensure proper interroga-
tion standards. Rather than specifically articulating permissible
11. Defined in this Article as the region from the late 1800's through the 1940's.
12. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
13. Id. (stating that the Authorization for the Use of Military Force was not a blank
check for the Administration to set up military commissions however they saw fit, but was
more like the "lowest ebb" of power, akin to Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 585-88 (1952), and requiring further Congressional approval for such commissions).
14. Id. at 2755.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2798.
17. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. § 948 (2006).
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interrogation methods, the Military Commissions Act grants the
executive the authority to interpret the scope and application of
Common Article III of the Geneva Convention.' As the following
discussion shows, interrogation standards must be established in a
clear and specific way so that the interrogators themselves know
the precise contours of permissible interrogation methods. The
vagueness of the Military Commissions Act leaves the standards
open to far too many "on the battlefield" abuses.
The Bram-Brown progeny offers examples of how extending
some constitutional protections found in domestic criminal law
might cure the deficiencies identified by the Hamdan Court. Again,
this is not to say that full constitutional protections should be
granted to detainees. Instead, the Constitution can be used as a
palette from which to draw certain rights that have historically
been successfully applied to domestic interrogations. The Bram-
Brown progeny symbolized a great watershed for extending existing
constitutional protections to African Americans in the interroga-
tion setting;' 9 Hamdan is similarly a watershed for protecting
detainees from coercive interrogation.0
This analysis requires occasional "leaps of faith." There are clear
differences between African Americans in the Deep South and the
current detainees in the "war on terrorism." In particular, citizen-
ship status and reasons for interrogation differ substantially.
However, the similarities between these situations make the com-
parison worthwhile. The African American experience in the
interrogation setting provides a clear frame of reference for ex-
ploring the limits of detainee interrogations.
This Article focuses on two interrogation methods common to
domestic criminal law, threats2' and cumulative mistreatment.
2
Methodologically, threats and cumulative mistreatment are useful
subjects for examination as they are common aspects of interroga-
tions widely understood by both laymen and jurists. This Article
includes a historical analysis of these two interrogation methods,
18. See id.
19. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-45 (1897) (speaking for the first time
regarding limits of interrogation); Brown v. United States, 297 U.S. 278, 279-87 (1936) (ad-
dressing for the first time interrogations of African Americans in the Deep South).
20. Just as the cases prior to the Branz-Brown progeny stand for acquiescence by the
courts and the government to interrogation methods used in the Deep South, so too the
decisions of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2003), and Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311
(D.D.C. 2005), stand for a modern deferential view of executive power.
21. Defined as a communicated intent to inflict harm, either physical or mental/on
another person's body or property. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1519 (8th ed. 2004). See infra
Part V.
22. Defined as continual abuses or prolonged punishments of a detainee aimed at
wearing down that detainee's will in an effort to extract information. See infra Part V.C.
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and then undertakes a jurisprudential analysis based on careful
examination of scholarship and Supreme Court decisions specifi-
cally pertaining to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Using
the hybrid model, this Article ultimately proposes a set of recom-
mendations for both policy-makers and decision-makers as they
seek to establish a legally permissible framework for future interro-
gations.
I. DETAINEE RIGHTS AND STATUS
To begin the process of determining which criminal law protec-
tions ought to extend to detainee interrogations, it is critical to
discuss who the detainees are and what rights they are currently
afforded.
A. Who are the Detainees?
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, numerous commentators,
scholars, and policy-makers sought to define the status and rights
of those captured and subsequently detained in Guantanamo Bay,
Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and elsewhere.3 The predominant discus-
sions at that time suggested that the detainees should be identified
either as prisoners of war2 4 entitled to full Geneva Convention pro-
tections, or as criminals granted rights in accordance with the
traditional criminal law paradigm. More than five years after 9/11,
this discussion remains incomplete and unsettled. Among other
difficulties, vague definitions of detainee status make the determi-
nation of the appropriate legal forum for the detainees
problematic. If they are neither prisoners of war nor criminals,
23. See generally Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantanamo: The Law of International De-
tainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (2006) (discussing the domestic and international
legal frameworks that apply to the transfer of a detainee from U.S. custody to the custody of
another state, particularly where torture is a concern); Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 9; Where
are Terrorists to be Tried, supra note 9; Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism and "The Water's
Edge": Sovereignty, "Territorial Jurisdiction," and the Reach of the U.S. Constitution in the Guan-
tanamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006) (discussing the legal status of
detainees).
24. The Geneva Convention defines a POW as a soldier who: 1) is part of a command
structure; 2) openly wears his insignia; 3) openly carries his arms; and 4) conducts himself
according to accepted laws of war. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War art. 4(A) (2), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. A soldier who is part of
a regular army of a state easily meets this test. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, What is an "Unlawful
Combatant," and Why It Matters (Jan. 23, 2002), http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/
20020123.html.
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then it is unclear how they should be classified and what rights they
are entitled to. This debate currently finds itself in the "twilight
zone" referred to by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tubing
Co. v. Sawyer,25 as Congress has not explicitly approved or disap-
proved any specific legal regime.
The matter is complicated because detained individuals do not
fit the accepted definition of soldiers in a regular army, as is re-
quired to obtain POW status. While it is arguable that al-Qaeda has
a command structure, detainees do not meet the other three parts
of the Geneva Convention definition, as they wear no clear insig-
nia, do not follow laws of war, and are not soldiers of any state's
26
army. Nor can the detainees be classified as common domestic
criminals, because of national security concerns, and, arguably,
their lack of citizenship. Therefore, detainees are neither given the
protections of the Geneva Convention, 7 nor are they granted the
rights of the traditional criminal law paradigm. s
In this context, it is important to understand the Court's Ham-
dan decision correctly. The Court in Hamdan clarified the need to
extend certain Geneva Convention protections, yet the ruling did
25. Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring). Some commentators have suggested that Hamdan v. Rumsfeld will become
equally important in determining the limits of executive power. See generally David Gray
Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 155 (2002)
(discussing the conflict involved in expansive executive authority); Joseph R. Biden, Jr. &
John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional Impasse: A joint Decision' Solution, 77 GEO.
L.J. 367 (1988) (discussing the war power in the Constitution); Themes Karalis, Foreign Policy
and Separation of Powers Jurisprudence: Executive Orders Regarding Export Administration Act Exten-
sion in Times of Lapse of Political Questions, 12 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109 (2004)
(proposing that the Export Administration Act is crucial to the government's ability to ob-
tain information from exporters for national security and foreign policy reasons); Lorell
Landis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act: How an Old Statute Mandates a New Under-
standing of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 196-98 (2005).
26. See, e.g., K. Elizabeth Dahlstrom, The Executive Policy Toward Detention and Trial of For-
eign Citizens at Guantanamo Bay, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 662 (2003); Adam Roberts,
Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 580 (2006); Brett Shumate, New Rules for a New War: The Applicability of the Geneva Conven-
tions to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees Captured in Afghanistan, 18 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 1 (2005);
Rui Wang, Note, Assessing the Bush Administration's Detention Policy for Taliban and AI-Qaeda
Combatants at Guantanamo Bay in Light of Developing United States Case Law and International
Humanitarian Law, Including the Geneva Conventions, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 413 (2005).
27. See David Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions ?, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 97 (2004); Srividhya Ragavan & Michael S. Mireles, Jr., The Status of Detain-
ees from Iraq and Afghanistan Conflicts, 2005 UTAH L. REv. 619 (2005); Omar Akbar, Note,
Losing Geneva in Guantanamo Bay, 89 IOWA L. REv. 195 (2003).
28. See MICHAEL RATNER & ELLEN RAY, GUANTANAMO: WHAT THE WORLD SHOULD
KNow 184 (2004); Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawful Combat-
ants? The Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantanamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, 1 J. INT'L CRIM.
JUST. 284 (2003); Tung Yin, Ending the War on Terrorism One Terrorist at a Time: A Noncriminal
Detention Model for Holding and Releasing Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 149 (2005).
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not suggest that detainees are prisoners of war." This is crucial be-
cause international law precludes bringing the detainees to trial if
they are classified as POWs. 3° The Hamdan Court's mandate to ex-
tend certain Geneva Convention privileges does not affect the
classification of individuals as detainees and enables trials to go
forward. Taking another approach, some scholars have advocated
for categorizing the detainees as criminals3' and applying clearly
delineated interrogation standards that have been established by
criminal law jurisprudence. 2 The prevailing view, however, is that
the detainees cannot be defined as domestic criminals, but must be
defined under some form of prisoner of war or enemy combatant
status. 33
A different legal regime would be in effect today if the Bush
Administration had responded to 9/11 by drawing the Hamdan
distinction and granting certain Geneva Convention protections to
detainees without extending actual POW status. Such a regime may
29. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795-97 (2006).
30. If defined as a prisoner of war, the individual may only be brought to trial on
charges of either war crimes or violations occurring during detention.
31. Tung Yin, The Role of Article I Courts in the War on Terrorism, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs.J. 1061 (2005);Jennifer Van Thiel, Note, Good for the Nation, Good for the Administration:
Why the Courts Should Hear the Guantanamo Bay Detainee Cases and How it Will Have Positive
Effects, 27 WHIrrER L. REV. 867 (2006).
32. See, e.g., Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) (holding eleven straight days of
questioning improper); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (finding interrogation of
defendant for thirty-six hours without a break coercive); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)
(refusing to admit defendant's confession where police threatened mob violence); White v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (precluding a death sentence based on a confession which re-
sulted from whipping and beating defendant); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)
(invalidating a confession where defendants were held at length, interrogated, and moved
around because of false threats of mob violence); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(invalidating a confession where defendants were subject to whippings and hanging); Brain
v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (striking down a confession where interrogator told
defendant that there was no question remaining as to his guilt, but that the only question
was how many accomplices there were). See generally Monrad Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REV. 411 (1954) (examining Fourth Amendment
confession cases); Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 309 (1998) (articulating a genealogy of confessions law); William Stuntz, The
Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REv. 780 (2006) (discussing constitu-
tional reform in four areas: policing, adjudication and crime definition, punishment, and
federalism); Peter B. Rutledge, The Standard of Review for the Voluntariness of a Confession on
Direct Appeal in Federal Court, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1311 (1996); Thomas P. Windom, The Writing
on the Wall: Miranda's "Prior Criminal Experience" Exception, 92 VA. L. REv. 387 (2006);John E
Blevins, Note, Lyons v. Oklahoma, the NAACP and Coerced Confessions Under the Hughes, Stone,
and Vinson Courts, 1936-1949, 90 VA. L. REv. (2004).
33. Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, to Commander, Department of Defense Joint
Task Force 170, in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH 168 (2004); Memorandum from
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, to Commander USSOUTHCOM (Jan. 15, 2003), in
MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH 183 (2004); Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant
Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in MARK
DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH 115 (2004).
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have passed judicial scrutiny, as the Court may have been satisfied
with the Administration granting "some" rights, rather than engag-
ing in the "mental gymnastics"3 4 that characterized the attempt to
determine the requisite protections for detainees.35 Now, five years
later, in the aftermath of the Hamdan decision, the Administration
is finally being forced to incorporate these protections.
B. Potential Sources of Rights
1. The Criminal Law Paradigm
An initial context from which to draw potential rights for de-
tainees is the domestic criminal law paradigm. Providing detainees
full rights and procedures of the traditional criminal law paradigm,
however, is both inappropriate and impossible.36 An example of
this impracticability is the constitutionally granted right to con-
front an accuser.37 In many counterterrorism trials there would be
significant problems associated with bringing accusers into open
court, since intelligence gathering largely relies on individuals be-
38ing willing to act as sources. As a result, a detainee could never be
fully apprised of the case against him or her as constitutionally re-
quired. Although the right to confront an accuser may not be
logistically possible in terrorism trials, there should still be an ef-
fort to extend as much of this right as is possible without
endangering national security. For instance, this specific dilemma
could be remedied by deeming a confidential source insufficient as
the sole basis for a conviction.
Another example of why the full criminal law paradigm cannot
be applied is that a detainee would then have to be "Mirandized"
upon arrest, even if captured on the battlefield. As an extreme il-
lustration, it is inconceivable that an American soldier would read
Osama Bin Laden his Miranda rights prior to interrogation, as
34. See Guiora & Page, supra note 7, at 440.
35. For a discussion of the Bush Administration infighting regarding appropriate pro-
cedures, see Tim Golden & Don Van Natta, Jr., Administration Officials Split Over Stalled
Military Tribunals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at Al, and Kate Zernike, Newly Released Reports
Show Early Concern on Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 6, 2005, at Al.
36. See, e.g., Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 9; Where are Terrorists to be Tried, supra note 9;
Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Alien Defen-
dants, 41 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 1 (2006); Richard Raimond, Comment, The Role of Indefinite
Detention in Antiterrorism Legislation, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 515 (2006).
37. "[T]he accused shall enjoy the right.., to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI..
38. See Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
319 (2004).
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would be required by the Supreme Court in the criminal law con-
text. Going further, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
might then apply to evidence found at the scene, presenting sig-
nificant logistical problems in counterterrorism trials.
These examples highlight why the criminal law paradigm cannot
be fully applied to the detainees. Additionally, the status of a de-
tainee is not that of a criminal in the traditionally accepted and
understood definition of the word. Thus, the criminal law para-
digm is not appropriate in the current detainee context. Rather,
aspects of the criminal law paradigm which could actually be ap-
plied to detainees must be clearly delineated.
2. The POW Paradigm
A second potential paradigm for discerning detainees' status
and rights is the POW paradigm. This paradigm, however, is also
inapplicable. First, detainees do not meet the Geneva Convention's
four-part test, so to classify them as POWs would be inappropriate
under international law.39 Further, a POW may not be brought to
trial unless he has either committed a war crime or a crime during
captivity. In addition, under international law a POW must be re-
turned to his home country upon the cessation of hostilities.1
Clearly, the concept of "cessation of hostilities" is incongruous with
the "war on terror," which is a conflict of a continuous nature.
Finally, the classification of detainees as POWs would impair any
opportunity to bring these individuals to justice, because if they
were actually tried and sentenced, such sentence could only last
until the "cessation of hostilities."
39. See supra note 28.
40. See supra note 28; see also Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay:
Humanitarian and Human Rights obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 No. 3 HuM. RTs.
BRIEF 6 (2002).
41. See Major Vaughn A. Ary, Concluding Hostilities: Humanitarian Provisions in Cease-Fire
Agreements, 148 MIL. L. REV. 186 (1995).
42. See generally Rosa Brooks, Protecting Rights in the Age of Terrorism: Challenges and Oppor-
tunities, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669 (2005) (discussing the current challenges to international
law); George C. Harris, Terrorism, War and Justice: The Concept of the Unlawful Enemy Combatant,
26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 31 (2003) (exploring the Bush Administration's applica-
tion of the unlawful enemy combatant doctrine to terrorism suspects and the resulting
implications for our criminal justice system); Vincent-Joel Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear it, if the
Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Sus-
pected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2005) (discussing the inconsistencies of the Bush
Administration's actions in the war on terror and human rights law).
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3. The Hybrid Paradigm of Rights for Detainees
Because the two paradigms above do not adequately balance
rights and procedures for detainees with national security interests,
the proper standards must reside elsewhere. The hybrid paradigm,
previously defined as "a true mix of both the criminal law and pris-
oner of war paradigms without [either] full Constitutional or
criminal procedure rights,"43 reflects the proper balance between
guaranteeing a detainee rights in the interrogation setting and
protecting national security. The hybrid paradigm neither ensures
a detainee full rights of a typical criminal defendant, nor throws
him into the "dungeons of the world." This framework instead rec-
ognizes the interests of both sides by not blindly granting full
criminal law rights, yet extending feasible protections. The ques-
tion then becomes what standards and protections should be
applied.
II. BRAM, BROWN, AND THEIR PROGENY
Because of similarities between the current treatment of detain-
ees and the historic treatment of African Americans in the Deep
South, the constitutional standards established by the Court for the
latter are applicable to the current situation. The proper starting
point for examining domestic jurisprudence relating to interroga-
tion methods is the Bram-Brown progeny. This line of cases
represents the Supreme Court's extension of constitutional protec-
tions in response to coercive and abusive interrogations of African
Americans in the Deep South.
A. Similarities in Treatment of African Americans
in the Deep South and Current Detainees
Before discussing the specific contours of the Bram-Brown prog-
eny, it is important to more thoroughly outline the similarities
between African Americans in the Deep South and detainees. Only
by first engaging in this historical examination will the later corre-
lation be understood so that a reading of history and an analysis of
the jurisprudence may contribute to modern practical policy rec-
ommendations.
43. See Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 9.
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In the Deep South, people detained by law enforcement officials
were mainly poor, illiterate African Americans without legal repre-
sentation who were subjected to threats, cumulative mistreatment,
and other interrogation methods that violated constitutional safe-
guards. This treatment continued until the Supreme Court finally
mandated the extension of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections. Similarly, the detainees in Guantanamo Bay are typically
poor, illiterate at least in English, have little or no access to attor-
neys, and are subjected to many threats and abuses from
authorities. Most importantly for this Article, the African American
experience, in interrogation cells, in the woods, and in local sher-
iffs' cars, bears an eerie resemblance to the experience of a
detainee captured in the aftermath of 9/11 and held in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, Bagram, and other "black sites."
4
There are, however, differences between the two groups that
must be acknowledged before moving forward. First, in terms of
citizenship, African Americans were historically considered partial
citizens of the United States, at least for some purposes45 and fol-
lowing the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
46Amendments were recognized as full citizens, while the detainees
are non-citizens. Secondly, detainees are subjected to coercive in-
terrogation not simply because of who they are, as was the case for
African Americans in the Deep South, but in the pursuit of infor-
mation. Along this line, the mistreatment of African Americans in
the Deep South was motivated largely by racism, whereas detainees
are seen as an "enemy" in a war-like setting. Again though, similari-
ties in treatment and the parallel lessons to be learned exceed the
issues raised by these differences. Further, in light of these ac-
knowledged differences, this Article does not suggest that all Brain-
Brown rules should be adopted in the detainee context, but rather
that the Bram-Brown progeny offers lessons and insight into the ex-
tension of protections to a previously unprotected class. Just as
allegations of abuse in the early to mid 1900s led to the establish-
ment of the "Wickersham Commission" 7 and eventually the Court
mandated extension of constitutional protections, detainee inter-
rogations have been accused of violating human and civil rights,'
and new, clear standards must be developed in response.
44. As coined by Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
45. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended ly U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
46. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, IV.
47. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, "No BLOOD, No FOUL": SOLDIERS' ACCOUNT OF
DETAINEE ABUSE IN IRAQ (2006), http://hrw.org/reports/2006/usO706/usO706web.pdf;
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From the late 1800s to the early 1900s, African Americans were
constant victims of popular violence aided by the complicity of lo-
cal law enforcement officials, and further subjected to
mistreatment in local jails.49 In the Deep South, African Americans
were often rounded up and accused without evidentiary justifica-
tion.s° For instance, the accusation by a white woman that an
African American man had sexually assaulted her sealed his arrest
regardless of proof; an accusation that he was merely "looking"
may have doomed him to "mob rule."51 In the same vein, many of
the detainees in the ill-defined "war on terror" have been detained
52
on a "round up" basis.
Partly as a response to allegations of abuse in the Deep South,
the 1931 Wickersham Commission Report on Lawlessness in Law En-
Michelle Voeller-Gleason, Soldier Pleads Guilty to Detainee Abuse, Others Face Charges, ARMY
NEWS SERVICE, May 25, 2004, http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story-id-key5992;
Steven C. Welsh, Int'l Sec. L. Project, Detainee Abuse-Abu Ghraib Court Martial: Staff Sgt.
Ivan Frederick (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.cdi.org/news/law/abu-ghraib-courts-martial-
frederick.cfm; Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S.: More than 600 Implicated in De-
tainee Abuse (Apr. 26, 2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/04/26/usint13268.htm;
Press Release, Human Rights Watch, U.S. Soldiers Tell of Detainee Abuse in Iraq (July 23,
2006), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/07/19/usint3767.htm.
49. See MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT, THE TURN-OF-
THE-CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 354-55 (2001) (stating
that there were 3385 documented mob lynchings of African Americans in the U.S. between
1882 and 1935); see also W. FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA
AND VIRGINIA, 1880-1930, at 262 (1993) (noting that of the 460 lynching victims in Georgia
between 1880 and 1930, 441 were African Americans).
50. As one example, the 1831 case of Nat Turner involved thousands of slaves acting in
rebellion. The response was not to search out the guilty parties for trial, but rather to hang
all African American men who either participated or were thought to have done so. Further,
night riders were organized with police authority to put down any groupings they deter-
mined to be secret meetings. See HERBERT APTHEKER, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 119 (1951);John A. Davis, Black, Crime, and American
Culture, 423 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL. & SOC. ScI. 89-98 (1976).
51. The Scottsboro Case, which has become the exemplar for "black on white" rapes, was
a case where the accuser's "whiteness" overrode any other evidentiary consideration. The
accused were convicted and sentenced to death, despite evidence of the accuser's involve-
ment in prostitution and adultery. One spectator told a reporter that the "victim might be a
fallen woman, but by God she is a white woman." LISA LINDQUIST DoRR, WHITE WOMEN,
RAPE, AND THE POWER OF RACE IN VIRGINIA 1900-1960 2 (2004).
52. Of the 760 detainees brought to Guantanamo Bay in 2002, the military has re-
leased 180 without ever charging any of them. Further, fifty-five percent of detainees are not
charged with having committed any hostile acts against the United States, only eight percent
of the detainees were characterized as al Qaeda fighters, numerous individuals have been
detained based merely on affiliations with large groups not on the Department of Home-
land Security watchlist, and only five percent of detainees were even captured by U.S. forces.
See MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., THE GUANTANAMO DETAINEES DURING DETENTION: DATA FROM
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECORDS (2006), http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-third_
report_7_l l06.pdf.
Interrogation of Detainees
forcement5 was established by President Herbert Hoover to deter-
mine the veracity of numerous reports regarding inappropriate
conduct of police departments in interrogation settings. In the
end, the Commission's members concluded that suspects had been
regularly subjected to "the third degree," defined as "the employ-
ment of methods which inflict suffering, physical or mental, upon
a person, in order to obtain from that person information about a
crime. 54 The Commission determined that willful infliction of pain
on criminal suspects was widespread and pervasive. The investiga-
tion also revealed that the abusers were not just interrogators, but
police officers, judges, magistrates, and other officials of the crimi-
nal justice system. The Commission found violations in the form of
illegal arrests, bribery, coercion of witnesses, fabrication of evi-
dence, and the aforementioned "third degree."55 Aside from the
Commission's report, the history of African Americans in southern
jails has been well documented and the subject of much commen-
tary.56 The complacency of local communities contributed to
mistreatment and, even more troubling, many abuses involved the
active or passive participation of local law enforcement."
There are significant similarities between the mistreatment in
the Deep South and abuses in modern detainee interrogations.
Beyond similarities in interrogation methods,8 there is an unfor-
tunate parallel in the tragedies that result from employing these
methods. Just as African Americans in the Deep South often died
as a result of physical mistreatment, such tragedies have also
53. One of fourteen reports published by the National Commission on Law Obser-
vance and Enforcement, or "The Wickersham Commission." See Samuel Walker, Records of
the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Dec. 1977), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/academic/guides/j urisprudence/wickersham.asp.
54. NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS
IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
55. Id. at 3.
56. See generally John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV.
539 (2006) (discussing the different approaches taken by the U.S. and the rest of the inter-
national community in dealing with hate speech); Seth F. Kreimer, "Torture Lite," "Full
Bodied" Torture, and the Insulation of Legal Conscience, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 187
(2005) (discussing the changing legal landscape on torture in the War on Terror); Rutledge,
supra note 32; Mitchell P. Schwartz, Compensating Victims of Police-Fabricated Confessions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1119 (2003) (discussing the problems with forced confessions).
57. See Brundage, supra note 49, at 18; Sherrilyn A. 1fill, Creating a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission for Lynching, 21 LAW & INEQ. 263, 281 (2003).
58. Techniques authorized by U.S. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld include the use of
stress positions, isolation, hoods over head, removal of comfort items, forced grooming,
removal of clothing, and using detainees' phobias to induce stress. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE? COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF
DETAINEES 29-48 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usO405/usO405.pdf.
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occurred in detainee interrogations;59 according to charges filed by
the U.S. military, Maj. Gen. Abed Hamed Mowhoush of the Iraqi
army was killed during the course of an interrogation. 60 Further,
additional instances of abuses inflicted by U.S. personnel are well
documented. 6' Discussing the findings of an investigation, Major
General Antonio Taguba lists the following as examples of detainee
mistreatment:
Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their
naked feet; Videotaping and photographing naked male and
female detainees; Forcibly arranging detainees in various
sexually explicit positions for photographing; Forcing detain-
ees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for
several days at a time; Forcing naked male detainees to wear
women's underwear; Forcing groups of male detainees to
masturbate themselves while being photographed and video-
taped; Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then
jumping on them; Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE
Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his
fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture; Writing 'I
am a Rapest' (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have
forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photo-
graphing him naked; Placing a dog chain or strap around a
naked detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a
picture; A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate
59. See Tim Golden, Army Faltered in Investigating Detainee Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
2005, at Al; Tim Golden, In US. Report, Brutal Details of 2 Afghan Inmates'Deaths, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2005, at Al.
60. Chief Warrant Officer Lewis E. Welshofer was charged with the offense, and ulti-
mately reprimanded in court, but not given jail time. See, e.g., No Prison Time for Soldier Held
in Iraqi's Death, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 24, 2006, A19.
61. See generally John T Parry, Just for Fun: Understanding Torture and Understanding Abu
Gharaib, 1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 253 (2005) (discussing the problems inherent in
defining the word torture and exploring the more general problem of state violence);James
W. Smith, III, A Few Good Scapegoats: The Abu Ghraib Courts-Martial and the Failure of the Military
Justice System, 27 WHITTIER L. REV. 671 (2006) (discussing the disparate treatment of enlisted
soldiers in the military justice system); Carlotta Gall & David Rhode, The Reach of War: The
Prisons; Afghan Abuse Charges Raise Questions on Authority, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A10;
Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Officials Are Hurrying to Correct Conditions in Iraqi Prisons, N.Y. TIMES,
September 9, 2004, at Al 4; Josh White, Memo Shows Officer's Shift on Use of Dogs, WASH. POST,
Apr. 15, 2006, at All.
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and frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and se-
verely injuring a detainee.2
These examples further illuminate the similarities between de-
tainee treatment and that of African Americans in the Deep South.
With respect to ill-treatment in the Deep South, the Supreme
Court finally entered the mix. In a series of monumental decisions
predicated on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court
held that interrogation methods in the Deep South were unconsti-
tutional, and that the government must immediately extend
constitutional protections and due process to remedy the situa-
63tion.
The Court in Hamdan similarly indicated to the government that
the legal regime established in the aftermath of 9/11 must be
changed. Specifically, the Court held that detainees are entitled to
Geneva Convention Article III protections, even though al Qaeda
is not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions.64 Specifically, detain-
ees are protected from "passing of sentences and the carrying out
of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regu-
larly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples" and since
conflict with al Qaeda was a "conflict not of an international char-
acter" within the meaning of Article III, they are provided some
minimal protection afforded to all individuals associated with a
conflict "in the territory of' a signatory.66
To comply with the ruling from Hamdan, the government would
benefit from looking to the historical extension of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to African Americans in the Deep South
carried out in response to the rulings of the Bram-Brown progeny.
B. Origins of the Bram-Brown Progeny
In Brain v. United States,66 the Supreme Court first entered the in-
terrogation setting. While the case did not involve an African
American, the Court's bright-line rule became central in later race-
based cases. Brain, a first officer, was accused of committing murder
62. Letter from Irene Kahn, Secretary General, Amnesty International, to George W.
Bush, President of the United States (May 7, 2004), http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGAMR510782004.
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2795 (2006).
65. Id. at 2795-97.
66. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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on board an American vessel sailing from Boston to South Amer-
ica.6' The crew overpowered Brain and put him in irons until the
vessel reached Halifax, where Brain was brought to jail and inter-
rogated by a detective from the Halifax Police Department.
68by9
Brain's subsequent confession led to his conviction for murder.69
Bram appealed, claiming that the confession was coerced, but the
interrogator testified that Brain had confessed without undue in-
fluence or coercion.7 ° Brain's counsel argued that Brain had been
brought to the detective's private office where he was stripped and
interrogated, and that "no statement made by the defendant while
so held in custody and his rights interfered with to the extent de-
scribed was a free and voluntary statement, and no statement as
made by him bearing upon this issue was competent."7" The
Court's decision to reverse Brain's conviction established a bright-
line rule with respect to threats made during interrogation:
A confession can never be received in evidence where the
prisoner has been influenced by any threat or promise; for
the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or
decide upon its effect upon the mind of the prisoner, and
therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence
has been exerted.72
Crucially, this strict Bram rule has never been overturned .
Rather, it has been affirmed through its incorporation into broader
tests, such as the "totality of the circumstances" test articulated by
the Court in Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee,4 which then morphed75
67. Id. at 534.
68. Id. at 536-37 (noting that the American consul eventually requested that Bram be
brought to Boston where he was formally charged with murder).
69. Id. at 540.
70. Id. at 538-39.
71. Id. at 539.
72. Id. at 543.
73. See Mark A. Goodsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law--The Interna-
tional Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investigators From Non-
Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851 (2003); Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions:
Lessons of Slavery, 49 How. L.J. 31 (2005); Marvin Zalman, The Coming Paradigm Shipt on
Miranda: The Impact of Chavez v. Martinez, 39 CRM. L. BULL. 4 (2003).
74. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 148 (1944); see also Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991) (holding ajailhouse confession coerced where defendant con-
fessed to a government agent posing as a fellow prisoner, and noting the continued
appropriateness of the Bram standard).
75. See David Aram Kaiser, Note, United States v. Coon: The End of Detrimental Reliance
for Plea Agreements, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (2001) (noting that for the middle third of the
twentieth century, the Court based the rule against admitting coerced confessions primarily,
if not exclusively, on notions of due process); MaryAnn Fenicato, Miranda Upheld by U.S.
Supreme Court, LA.J., Sept. 2000, at 2, available at Westlaw 2 No. 19 LAWYERSJ 2 (explaining
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into the "shocks the conscience" test developed in Rochin v. Califor-
nia for determining whether an interrogation violated a suspect's
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rights.7" Bram's bright-line rule
specifically acknowledged that:
[T] here can be no doubt that long prior to our independence
the doctrine that one accused of crime could not be com-
pelled to testify against himself had reached its full
development in the common law ... as resting on the law of
nature, and was imbedded in that system as one of its great
and distinguishing attributes."
Thus established, the Brain rule was extended in a series of cases
that represent the core of the Supreme Court's intervention in the
interrogations of African American suspects, and ended with man-
dated application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
C. Jurisprudence of the Bram-Brown Progeny
The Supreme Court's initial Deep South interrogation case was
Brown v. Mississippi.78 Brown presented the question of whether con-
victions based solely on confessions extorted by State officers
through brutality and violence were consistent with the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process requirement.7 9 The holding was, and
still is, of particular importance because "due process doctrine for
police interrogations began its life with the Court's dramatic crea-
tion of a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule in Brown."
8
0
The petitioners in Brown, all African Americans, were convicted
of the murder of a white man, and were arrested, indicted, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to death in just one week.8' Upon the
that "the due process test was utilized in approximately thirty different cases ... and con-
tinually refined into an inquiry examining whether a defendant's will was overborne by
'weighing the circumstances of pressure against the power of resistance of the person con-
fessing.' "); Edward L. Fiandach, Miranda Revisited, CHAMPION, Nov. 2005, at 22 (describing
the Court's return to the rationale of Bram, with a focus on the motivation to make the
statement and whether the decision to testify against one's self was "free and voluntary").
76. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (finding that the "shocks the con-
science" test stands for the proposition that the police cannot procure evidence for a
criminal prosecution in a particularly offensive manner, here a forced stomach pump to
look for drugs in defendant's stomach).
77. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 545 (1897).
78. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
79. Id. at 279.
80. Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195, 2203 (1996).
81. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279.
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discovery of a dead body, local sheriffs retrieved one of the peti-
tioners and took him to the house of the deceased, where a mob
had gathered to accuse him of the crime.82 When the petitioner
denied his guilt, the mob seized him and, with the sheriff's assis-
tance, hung him, then let him down before hanging him a second
time as Brown repeatedly proclaimed his innocence. The mob
then tied the petitioner to a tree and whipped him, then finally
released him to stagger home.84 The sheriff later returned to
Brown's home to arrest him, and while transporting Brown to jail,
stopped and severely whipped him, threatening that he would con-
tinue until the defendant confessed.85 Brown finally acceded to the
demands and confessed, yet the whippings continued until the
confession's specific language was in accordance with that desired
by the officers. 6
The Court in Brown held that the trial court should have disal-
lowed the confessions because of the brutality used to procure
them. Specifically, the Court used the "totality of the circum-
stances" approach:
There was thus enough before the court when these confes-
sions were first offered to make known to the court that they
were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free and voluntary;
and the failure of the court then to exclude the confessions is
sufficient to reverse the judgment, under every rule of proce-
dure that has heretofore been prescribed, and hence it was
not necessary subsequently to renew the objections by motion
or otherwise."
These two watershed cases, Bram and Brown, extended protec-
tions through the use of two constitutional principles: the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination in Bram, and the Four-
teenth Amendment due process clause in Brown.88
82. Id. at 280-82.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 463.
88. See generally Fenicato, supra note 75; Laura Magid, Deceptive Interrogation Practices:
How Far is Too Far, 99 MicHi. L. REv. 1168, 1172-73 (2001) ("In 1936 ... with Brown v. Mis-
sissippi, the Court turned to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the
basis for examining the voluntariness of confessions in dozens of state cases. The Court held
that police use of violence was 'revolting to the sense ofjustice,' stating that '[t]he rack and
torture chamber may not be substituted for the witness stand.' ").
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These principles were further elaborated in the following cases,
chosen both for their depiction of the progressive application of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to African Americans, and
also because they illustrate the violent nature of interrogations in
the Deep South, which is comparable to modern detainee interro-
gations.
In White v. Texas, an African American farmhand was convicted
of rape and subsequently sentenced to death. 9 White was taken to
a local jail, where each night armed officers took him into the
woods, asked him to confess, whipped him, and warned him not to
tell anyone what transpired.90 White, who was illiterate, eventually
signed a written confession.9' In reversing the defendant's convic-
tion, the Court held that "due process of law, preserved for all by
our Constitution, commands that no such practice as that disclosed
by this record shall send any accused to his death."92
Two years later in Ward v. Texas, an African American man ac-
cused of killing a white man appealed his murder conviction,
arguing that it was based on a coerced confession.93 Upon arrest,
the police told the defendant that mobs were waiting for him in
various towns, and took him from town to town under the cover of
night, not allowing him to sleep.94 Ward contended that he only
offered a confession after "he had been arrested without a warrant,
taken from his home town, driven for three days from county to
county, placed in ajail more than 100 miles from his home, ques-
tioned continuously, and beaten, whipped, and burned by the
officer to whom the confession was finally made. 95 The Ward Court
held that accepting the defendant's confession into evidence was a
denial of his due process rights because of the cumulative mis-
treatment 96 to which he was subjected:
[W] e must conclude that this confession was not free and vol-
untary but was the product of coercion and duress, that
petitioner was no longer able freely to admit or to deny or to
89. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
90. Id. at 532.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 533 (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)).
93. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
94. See id. at 549, 553-55.
95. Id. at 549.
96. See infra Part V.C (defining the term and explaining that finding cumulative mis-
treatment depends on particular circumstances such as amount of movement, specific
length of time, number of people, etc., to make a determination of when the "continuous-
ness" breaks the individual's will).
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refuse to answer, and that he was willing to make any state-
ment that the officers wanted him to make.
This Court has set aside convictions based upon confessions
extorted from ignorant persons who have been subjected to
persistent and protracted questioning, or who have been
threatened with mob violence, or who have been unlawfully
held incommunicado without advice of friends or counsel, or
who have been taken at night to lonely and isolated places for
questioning. Any one of these grounds would be sufficient
cause for reversal. All of them are to be found in this case.97
Moving forward, in 1944 petitioners in Asheraft v. Tennessee also
claimed that their convictions had been improperly extorted by law
enforcement officials. 9 Ashcraft was questioned continuously for
more than thirty-six hours by a relay of police officers. 9 In revers-
ing the convictions, the Ashcraft Court held that, under the "totality
of the circumstances" test, the confessions were compelled through
cumulative mistreatment, which was a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' ° The particular importance of Ashcraft is its factual
distinction from the previous cases in that the conviction was over-
turned not because of physical abuse, but rather on grounds of
cumulative mistreatment, where " ... Ashcraft from Saturday eve-
ning at seven o'clock until Monday morning at approximately
nine-thirty never left this homicide room of the fifth floor."' 0 ' The
Ashcrafl dissent, however, was concerned that the majority's posi-
tion could be construed to mean that any lengthy interrogation was
"inherently coercive," and they argued that there still needed to be
a focus on the actual coerciveness of the interrogation.'
The Bram-Brown progeny's litany of violent and coercive interro-
gations typifies the treatment of African Americans in the Deep
South. African Americans were arrested with little evidentiary
cause, subjected to threats of violence and cumulative mistreat-
ment, and physically tortured to induce confessions. In each of these
cases, the Court took great measures to demand that the previously
constitutionally unprotected citizens receive the constitutional guar-
antees afforded to the rest of society.
97. Ward, 316 U.S. at 555.
98. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 145 (1944).
99. Id. at 153.
100. Id. 153-55.
101. Seeid. at 149.
102. See id. at 157.
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III. APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FROM THE
BRAM-BROWN PROGENY TO THE DETAINEE CONTEXT
Selected cases of the Brain-Brown progeny highlight conduct that
is similar to that in the current detainee situation. Like the African
American suspects in the cases described above, detainees have in
many instances been rounded up and detained based on vague
and unarticulated suspicion of guilt, subjected to violent and de-
grading interrogations, and held until their will is broken, so that
they often give untrustworthy confessions. Beyond the specific
criminal law aspects of the Bram-Brown progeny, the lesson for
modern policy- and decision-makers is to see the constitutional
limits on interrogation methods the Supreme Court has placed on
American law enforcement. To extend such constitutional protec-
tions to detainees, however, requires a discussion of the application
of constitutional provisions to non-citizens and an examination of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the interrogation con-
text.
A. Extending Constitutional Protections to Aliens
First, the gap between African American partial citizens and de-
tainee non-citizens must be bridged to make the central
comparison of this Article. This Article's analysis is based on the
acceptance of the argument that certain constitutional protections
should be extended to both American citizens and non-citizens
held by the United States. This premise is critical because the de-
tainees currently held in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere are
generally not American citizens. 0 3 This Article assumes that at least
some constitutional protections must be extended to non-citizen
detainees to remedy abuses that have occurred since 9/11, most
notably in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. For the purposes of
this Article's argument, non-citizen aliens do not include "illegal
aliens" as the term is commonly understood. This discussion in-
volves only alien detainees, individuals brought within the
103. Exceptions include: Hamdi, who was initially held in Guantanamo Bay and trans-
ferred to a naval brig in South Carolina when his claim of American citizenship was verified;
John Lindh Walker, captured in Afghanistan but tried and convicted in U.S. District Court;
and Jose Padilla, the subject of numerous habeas lawsuits who will be tried in federal court
in Miami on a series of lesser charges.
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jurisdiction of the United States against their will by U.S. soldiers
acting upon the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.
0 4
The question of non-citizen rights was first addressed by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, where the Court
held that the Fifth Amendment's reach was not limited to the geo-
graphic boundaries of the states but extended to all incorporated
territories of the United States. 0 5 Since Dred Scott, the Court has
developed two distinct lines of cases relevant to determining de-
tainee rights; first distinguishing between individuals within and
outside of the United States, and secondly distinguishing between
citizens and non-citizens.
Case law first extended constitutional protections to include
persons who could demonstrate cognizable ties to the United
States, where the clearest tie was physical location within the bor-
der.'06 This extension of rights to all those within the territory
directly impacts this Article, and makes the territorial classification
of Guantanamo Bay of the utmost importance. If Guantanamo Bay
is found to be a territory of the United States, then precedent dic-
tates that fundamental rights, like the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, should apply. Conversely, if Guantanamo Bay is not a
territory, then detainees would not necessarily be afforded consti-
tutional protections there.' 7
While the Constitution did not initially reach beyond the territo-
rial boundaries of the United States, the "Insular Cases"'08 began to
expand protections to some persons outside of the territory,
though they did not specifically address non-citizens. The "Insular
Cases" offered explicit legal justification of American endeavors in
104. See generally Valerie L. Barth, Anti-Immigrant Backlash and the Role of the Judiciary: A
Proposal for Heightened Review of Federal Laws Affecting Immigrants, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 105
(1997) (proposing interpreting the word "person" in the Fifth Amendment to include any
and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic);Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an
Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens and the Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 79 (2004) (discussing the redefinition of citizenship in regard to individuals
suspected of disloyalty); Wendy R. St. Charles, Note, Recognizing Constitutional Rights of Ex-
cludable Aliens: The Ninth Circuit Goes Out on a Limb to Free the "Fying Dutchman'--Dispensing
with a Legal Fiction Creates and Opportunity for Reform 4 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 145 (1995)
(discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision to apply constitutional protections to illegal immi-
grants).
105. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
106. See United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
107. See generally In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (denying defendant's appeal where the
trial took place outside of the United States because the Fifth Amendment did not apply
and validating the inquiry into whether defendant seeking constitutional protection was
inside or outside of the United States).
108. Nine cases addressing constitutional questions regarding the status of Puerto Rico
and the Philippines in 1901. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); DeLima v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
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Puerto Rico, created a system by which America could exert power
over a foreign entity, defined the framework for granting legal and
political rights to Puerto Ricans, and facilitated the establishment
of practices which recognized and validated the colonial project in
Puerto Rico."°9 Further, in determining the extraterritorial reach of
constitutional protections, the Court increasingly decided that citi-
zens "carry" their constitutional rights outside of the territory of
the United States. In 1990, for example, the Court held in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez that the Fifth Amendment applies to any
"person" or "accused" as opposed to the more restrictive Fourth
Amendment protection of "the people."" °
As for non-citizens, after the Dred Scott decision expanded consti-
tutional protections, in 1950 the Court in Johnson v. Eisentrager
noted the steady progression of rights courts were granting to
aliens."' The Eisentrager Court followed the trend, holding that
physical presence in the country alone creates an implied guarantee
of certain rights, which become even more extensive when an ac-
tive statement of intent to become a citizen is made." 2 The Court
reasoned that "in extending constitutional protections beyond the
citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point out that it was the
alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judi-
ciary power to act.
'
013
Applying these principles to the Guantanamo detainees, the
court in Khalid v. Bush held that Guantanamo Bay detainees do not
possess any cognizable rights because non-citizens detained by the
United States outside of domestic borders cannot avail themselves
of constitutional protections." 4 Rasul v. Bush, however, gave a
slightly different interpretation of the proper extension of consti-
tutional protections in a place with an undetermined territorial
definition, such as Guantanamo Bay."5 Rasul stands for the propo-
sition that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a detainee's
habeas petition whenever the detainee is held in a place where the
"United States exercises complete jurisdiction and control.""1 6
109. See generally Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include "The Insu-
lar Cases" and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241 (2000) (discussing
which set of texts should be included in the core material of constitutional law).
110. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265-66 (1990).
111. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770-71 (1950).
112. Id. at770.
113. Id.
114. Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 321 (D.D.C. 2005) (dealing with foreign na-
tionals captured on the battlefield and brought to Guantanamo Bay who filed petitions for
writ of habeas corpus).
115. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473-84 (2004).
116. Id.at 480.
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Further arguing for constitutional protections for detainees, the
court in In re Guantanamo Detainees Cases initially cited Rasul as
agreeing with the Eisentrager precedent barring claims of an alien
seeking to enforce the Constitution in a habeas proceeding outside
of a sovereign territory of the United States.' However, the In re
Guantanamo Detainees Cases court further explained that the Eisen-
trager decision was inapplicable to the Guantanamo detainees
because the detainees, unlike the German petitioners in Eisentrager,
"have been imprisoned in territory over which the U.S. exercises
exclusive jurisdiction and control." 8
Thus, in light of the jurisprudence of Eisentrager and subsequent
Supreme Court decisions, the appropriate extension of constitu-
tional protections to detainees turns on the territorial status of
Guantanamo Bay and the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and control
over Guantanamo Bay and other detention facilities. Clearly, Guan-
tanamo detainees must be granted protections if Guantanamo Bay
is accepted as a territory of the United States. Further, in other de-
tention locations (and in Guantanamo if it is not a U.S. territory),
given the sufficient connection to the United States, the detainees
may not be inherently entitled to full constitutional rights, but they
arguably deserve certain constitutional protections.
B. Analysis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
in the Context of Interrogations
The protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
inextricably tied to the interrogation setting in the domestic crimi-
nal law paradigm. The Fifth Amendment specifically protects an
individual from self-incrimination and was applied to the interro-
gation setting in Bram.'19  In addition to extending Fifth
Amendment protections, the Brain-Brown progeny also granted
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights to African Americans
in the context of interrogations." °
117. In irGuantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 449 (D.D.C 2005).
118. Rasu, 542 U.S. at 476 (noting that the German detainees in Eisentrager were held
and tried by the United States Army in the "China Theatre," but upon their convictions were
sent to Germany to serve their sentences).
119. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-57 (1897).
120. "... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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1. The Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination
For this Article, the ultimate question regarding the Fifth
Amendment is whether the right against self-incrimination should
be extended to detainees. Other Fifth Amendment-related protec-
tions, such as Miranda rights, are likely impracticable where an
individual is arrested in the "zone of combat,' 2' but it remains an
open question whether such protections may be granted to a de-
. 122tainee once he is in the interrogation setting.
In the Bram-Brown progeny, the Supreme Court extended the
Fifth Amendment to protect African Americans in the Deep South.
In the aftermath of Hamdan this right, or at least parts of it, needs
to be extended to the detainees as well. 23 Although not directly
addressing self-incrimination, the Hamdan Court's opinion in-
cludes a scathing criticism of the military commissions as a whole,
and implicitly incorporates the lack of Fifth Amendment protec-
tions. In opposition, the Bush Administration had previously
argued that "it is not practicable to apply in military commissions
under this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts.',
12 4
While it can be argued that detainee self-incrimination is a moot
point where information is never heard in open court, the Su-
preme Court in Bram linked the Fifth Amendment's protections
against self-incrimination to general limitations of acceptable in-
terrogation methods.' 25 In addressing the question of the extension
of Fifth Amendment rights to non-citizens, courts and scholars
have often wrestled with exactly this issue. For instance, in the recent
immigration decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the precedent of applying Fifth Amendment due process to
121. Defined in traditional warfare as where armies face each other, but significantly
expanded in the "armed conflict short of war" to include the civilian populations and urban
residential areas.
122. See, e.g., Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect's Right to the Assistance of Counsel: The Ambiva-
lence of the Israeli Law Against the Backdrop of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205 (2004);
Jonathan E Lenzner, From a Pakistani Stationhouse to the Federal Courthouse: A Confession's Uncer-
tain Journey in the U.S.-Led Waron Terror, 12 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 297 (2004); Sean D.
Murphy, Executive Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 820 (2004).
123. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Orwell Has Nothing on This White House, L.A. TiMES, July 14,
2006, at B13; Bob Herbert, The Definition of Tyranny, N.Y. TiMES,July 17, 2006, at Al7; Adam
Liptak, Scholars Agree That Congress Could Reject Commissions, but Not That It Should, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2006, at A10; Kate Zernike & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Detainee Rights Create a Divide on
Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES,July 10, 2006, at Al.
124. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
125. Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).
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aliens present within the United States, regardless of their legal
status. 6 Specifically, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment is
incongruent with a law that would permit the indefinite detention
of a non-citizen on domestic soil, explaining that once present in
the country, aliens can claim due process protections.
27
Further, the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez, denying a motion to sup-
press evidence seized from the Mexico home of a Mexican citizen
without a warrant, ruled that Fourth Amendment rights do not ex-
tend to non-citizens outside the borders of the U.S. 2 The Court,
however, made a point to distinguish its holding from what might
have occurred had the appeal been regarding the Fifth Amend-
ment, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment's application was
only to "the people," whereas the Fifth Amendment applies to
"persons."' 29 Although not explicitly extending Fifth Amendment
protections to non-citizens, the Court used dicta to indicate that
such a holding is not beyond the pale. 3" In addition, Justice Ken-
nedy, in his concurring opinion, stated that the defendant should
be entitled to due process clause protection under the Fifth
Amendment when his case finally went to trial.'3'
Consensus on the appropriate extension of constitutional pro-
tections to non-citizens has not yet been reached. However, as
shown in Zadvydas and Verdugo-Urduidez, the Supreme Court seems
inclined to extend Fifth Amendment safeguards to all "persons"
subject to control of the United States government. Along this line,
the detainees did not willingly come to be under U.S. control, but
rather were brought under control by U.S. authorities. In addition,
in the case of the Guantanamo Bay detainees, interrogation takes
place in American custody on soil that is as American as possible
without actually being within U.S. borders. Lastly, the detainees,
who are "innocent until proven guilty," are solely defined as suspects
at the interrogation stage. Suspects, regardless of what crime they
may potentially be found guilty of, are entitled to Fifth Amendment
protections.3 2 This principle was held to be true for African
Americans in the Deep South and for all non-citizens living in the
126. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); see also Shirin Sinnar, Patriotic or Unconstitu-
tional: The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. Rav. 1419
(2003).
127. Zadvydas, 533 U.S at 693 (internal citations omitted).
128. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
129. Id. at 265-66.
130. Id.
131. See also Brenner A. Allen, A Cause of Action Against Private Contractors and the U.S.
Government for Freedom of Speech Violations in Iraq, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L & COM. REG. 535, 585
(2005).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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United States, and should now be applied to detainees held by the
United States.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process
Historically, extending constitutional protections to non-citizens
has involved the Fourteenth Amendment at almost every turn.'
Additionally, it is relatively certain that the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended it to apply to non-citizens.
Congressional debates surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment show that the drafters had a close
familiarity with the provisions of the Articles of Confederation, a
document that noted a strict line of demarcation between
"citizens" and "persons." The framers did not use the term
"citizens" in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather made frequent reference to "persons," which can be
interpreted to include non-citizens. 134 This is highly relevant to the
focus of this Article in analyzing whether the Supreme Court's
holdings regarding Fourteenth Amendment due process may be
applied to the detainees in the hybrid paradigm.
133. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 467, 481 (2004) (reversing In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases and holding that the District Court did have jurisdiction to hear the detainees'
habeas claims because "[the Guantanamo petitioners] are not nationals of countries at war
with the United States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression
against the United States; they have never been afforded access to any tribunal, much less
charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have been
imprisoned in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and
control," and emphasizing that "[a]liens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are
entitied to invoke the federal courts' authority under [the habeas statute]"); Kwon v. Cold-
ing, 344 U.S. 590 (1953);Johnson v. Eisentrager 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (stating that "[m]ere
lawful presence in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct"); Medina v.
O'Neill, 838 F.2d 800 (5th Cir. 1988); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363, 1374 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that aliens "are entitled under the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state or federal
officials"); Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1467 (11th Cir. 1983) ("As a general rule aliens
who have effected an entry, whether lawfully or not, are accorded the full panoply of tradi-
tional due process rights."), affd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d
450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that the President constitutionally detained petitioner, a
United States citizen, as an enemy combatant pursuant to executive war powers and noting
that one who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign theater of war, regardless
of his citizenship, may properly be designated an enemy combatant and treated as such).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1638 (1862).
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3. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Applied to the Hybrid Paradigm
The standards used when applying the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the hybrid paradigm may be one of two options
created by precedent: the "totality of the circumstances" test and
the "voluntariness" test."35 Briefly, the totality of the circumstances
approach requires the Court to examine all of the factors sur-
rounding a confession to determine its validity, while the
voluntariness test specifically focuses on whether the defendant
freely decided to confess.
The voluntariness test, which is most applicable for targeting
confessions, has its roots in English common law and early Ameri-
can jurisprudence. 36 From this historical precedent, American
courts began to recognize two constitutional bases for requiring
that a confession be voluntary: the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause.3 7 The question in applying the voluntariness test to detain-
ees is how deferential of a standard ought to be used for
interrogations in the context of "armed conflict short of war." For
example, should interrogators be allowed to apply physical force,
to threaten the detainee in the name of national security, or to use
cumulative mistreatment until the detainee confesses?
Historically, common law had few constraints on permissible
methods used to gain a confession. Over time, however, American
courts grew concerned about the reliability of confessions involving
physical abuse. Eventually, in Brown, the Court found that circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation had led to a false confession
where law enforcement employed the "third degree." 38 The Brown
Court used a "totality of the circumstances analysis to determine
whether 'the interrogation was ... unreasonable or shocking, or if
135. See Magid, supra note 88, at 1172-73.
136. SeeRv. Rudd, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (K.B.) (stating that the English courts
excluded confessions obtained by threats and promises); R v. Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng.
Rep. 234, 235 (K.B.) ("A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit,
because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt ... but a confession forced
from the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a
shape... that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.").
137. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (reversing a conviction based on co-
erced confession under the due process clause); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44
(1897) (stating that the voluntariness test "is controlled by that portion of the Fifth
Amendment... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself ").
138. Broum, 297 U.S. at 281.
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the accused clearly did not have an opportunity to make a rational
or intelligent choice.' ,139
However, as explained by Professor Laura Magid, the totality of
the circumstances test was occasionally overly complex:
The totality of the circumstances test required courts to con-
sider: the conduct and actions of the officers; the physical
surroundings of the interrogation; and the characteristics and
status of the defendant, including both physical and mental
condition. Some types of police conduct were deemed so co-
ercive that no examination of the particular susceptibilities of
the suspect was even necessary. Most notably, physical violence
and threats, whether implicit or explicit, could not be di-
rected against any suspect. Physical mistreatment, such as
extended periods of interrogation without intervals for sleep,
also provided grounds for finding involuntariness.
140
As an alternative to the totality of the circumstances test, Magid
proposes the "shocks the conscience" test, "useful for determining
when police deception during interrogation goes too far, and 'so
shocks sensibilities of civilized society as to violate due process.' 041
In practice, however, the shocks the conscience standard bars only
those few techniques that, while not involving physical coercion
clearly forbidden under the voluntariness test or implicating the
concerns of the reliability rationale, nevertheless violate funda-
mental values of the people.42 There are only a limited number of
hypothetical situations that fit into this category.1
4 3
In the context of detainee interrogation, both the voluntariness
test and the shocks the conscience test are appropriate to
superimpose onto the hybrid paradigm. These tests are the most
applicable because they focus specifically on the tactics used in
gathering information. The shocks the conscience test, in
particular, is useful because it is not concerned with the eventual
use of the information received, but focuses on the acceptability of
techniques. Detainee interrogations are often conducted for
divergent purposes, whether to gather intelligence or to get
information for an upcoming trial, and the shocks the conscience
test permits the development of standards specifically addressing
139. See Magid, supra note 88, at 1173.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1208 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1208-09 (pointing to the example of the imposter chaplain as falling under
this standard).
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conduct. Ultimately, the use of this test counters the argument that
detainee standards must be different than those in criminal law
because the interrogations have different aims.
To understand how these standards can be incorporated into a
novel arena, it is critical to examine American history. Again, the
treatment of African Americans in the 1930s and 1940s is illustra-
tive, with the Brain-Brown progeny holding that certain
interrogation methods violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. A particularly important aspect of the Brain-Brown
progeny is that the Court did not create a new set of rules, but de-
vised a remedy through a progressive and active implementation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.4 5 This transformative mo-
ment in American constitutional law led to a fundamental
restructuring of basic rights and the extension of criminal law
paradigm protections to African Americans.
Today, the United States is at yet another transformative mo-
ment in constitutional law, which must lead to a restructuring of
basic constitutional guarantees similar to the changes that followed
the holdings of the Brain-Brown progeny. Recognizing that the de-
tainees are not American citizens, they must still be granted certain
limited protections. 4 6 Years ago, the Court deemed the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to be appropriate tools to protect a dis-
criminated and oppressed group from coercive interrogations; the
same jurisprudential standard should be applied to detainees in
the modern context.
IV: COERCIVE INTERROGATION AND TORTURE
This Article has thus far revolved around the coercive interroga-
tion of detainees through the use of threats and cumulative
mistreatment. Before proceeding any further, it is important to de-
termine what coercive interrogation is and examine the reality of
its modern use. In addition, this Part will touch upon the subject of
torture, arguing that it is, in any form, illegal and immoral and
144. See supra Part II.
145. SeeJACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER THE LAw (1965); Akil Reed Amar, The Su-
preme Court, 1999 Term, Forward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26 (2000);
Richard L. Aynes, Unintended Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us
About Its Interpretation, 39 AKRON L. REv. 289 (2006); Jack M. Balkin, Wrong the Day It Was
Decided: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677 (2005); David E. Berstein,
Fifty Years After Bolling v. Sharpe: Boiling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93
GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005); Magid, supra note 88; Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels,
119 HARV. L. REv. 1680 (2006).
146. See Quirin to Hamdan, supra note 9.
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must be clearly defined and regulated so that interrogators avoid
abuses in the detainee interrogation context.
A. Coercive Interrogation Must be Specifically Defined
One proposed definition of "coercive interrogation" was put
forth by Professors Posner and Vermeule:
(1) the application of force, physical or mental (2) in order to
extract information (3) necessary to save others. Coercive in-
terrogation can range from the mild to the severe. At some
point of severity, coercive interrogation becomes a species of
'torture,' which is flatly prohibited by domestic and interna-
tional law. Coercive interrogation and torture are thus
partially overlapping concepts; neither is a proper subset of
the other. Mild coercive interrogation does not amount to le-
gal 'torture,' which requires that a threshold of severity be
met. And there are forms of torture that are not coercive in-
terrogation-for example, when torture is used as a means of
political intimidation or oppression, indeed for any purpose
other than extracting information necessary to save third-
party lives.
14
1
The above definition, however, is unsatisfactory. Given the
documented instances where regulations, rules, and guidelines
have been "liberally" interpreted, proposed definitions and stan-
dards must not be circular, nor over-burdened with legalese and
technicalities. Promulgating memos with vague standards serves
only to create an environment where detainees can be subjected to
mistreatment similar to that recently publicized out of Abu Ghraib.
For example, although Lyndi England, the Abu Ghraib guard pho-
tographed abusing detainees, likely did not read the Bybee or Yoo
memos148 and base her conduct on their arguments, the memos
tainted the mood and atmosphere throughout the military such
that abuses were able to occur.
Additionally, the "middle ground" approach proposed by Posner
and Vermeule is problematic in light of interrogation room realities.
It may be sufficient to create vague and compromising standards
when writing from the vantage point of academia, but such propos-
als are troublesome when put into action. As evidenced by the
147. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4.
148. SeeJoseph Margulies, The Right to a Fair Trial in the War on 7eror, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L
L. 57, 61 (2006) (discussing both memos).
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political fallout resulting from soldiers' misinterpretation and
abuse of vague standards, it is inappropriate to leave the interpre-
tation of loosely defined principles to those in the interrogation
rooms or on the front lines.
The potential for improper application of guidelines is particu-
larly obvious considering that most abuses thus far have taken
place under multiple standards articulated by the U.S. Army. First,
Army Regulation 190-8, paragraph 2-1 (d), referencing allowable
procedures, states, "[p] risoners may be interrogated in the combat
zone. The use of physical or mental torture or any coercion to
compel prisoners to provide information is prohibited ...
[p] risoners may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to un-
pleasant or disparate treatment of any kind because of their refusal
to answer questions." Secondly, Army Field Manual 34-52, the con-
trolling doctrine on this subject, states:
U.S. policy expressly prohibit[s] acts of violence or intimida-
tion, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or
exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to in-
terrogations.
Such illegal acts are not authorized and will not be con-
doned by the US Army. Acts in violation of these prohibitions
are criminal acts punishable under the [Uniform Code of
Military Justice] I.4
Though these standards appear relatively clear and concise, they
have suffered from "slippery slope" interpretation. In short, if
standards are not abundantly clear and precise, they are destined
for abuse and loose interpretation. Drawing on the "void for
vagueness" doctrine, 150 a set of standards and procedures that are
overly vague should be held by the courts to be void for their lack
of specificity.
The United States government has taken steps to address coer-
cive interrogation by the recent adoption of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006.2" While this move begins to respond to
the Court's concerns in Hamdan, it is still insufficient in remedying
the lack of interrogation standards, as it allows executive interpre-
tation instead of articulating standards from the outset. Under the
149. DEP'T OF THE ARMy, FIELD MANUAL 34-52: INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION 1-8
(1992), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm34-52.pdf.
150. See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, Revis-
ited, 30 AM.J. CRIM. L. 279 (2003).
151. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
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Act, interrogators do not know exactly what is permissible, thus the
Act leaves itself open to abuse.
In creating a definition of coercive interrogation and developing
interrogation standards, a delicate balance must be struck between
the government's national security interests and the equally valid
interests of an individual in his or her personal autonomy. This Ar-
ticle proposes that these two interests are effectively balanced by a
clear articulation of permissible interrogation standards that allow
the following methods: the use of uncomfortable chairs, room
temperature modification, sleep deprivation, loud music, and the
use of hoods. In applying these acceptable interrogation methods,
an active judiciary is critical. 152 Independent review is necessary to
ensure both procedural and substantive oversight, and to chal-
lenge an unfettered executive so that competing interests of
national security and personal autonomy are fairly considered.
Lastly, the reality of modern coercive interrogation is that the
detainees are perpetually at a disadvantage that cannot be reme-
died with a vague, "middle ground" approach. Much like the
members of the Wickersham Commission were shocked to discover
the realities of the "third degree," American policy-makers were
equally astounded by the realities of interrogations at Abu
Ghraib.' 53 Practically, interrogation necessarily puts the power of
the state against the power of the individual in an inevitable "mis-
match." 54 This mismatch was particularly acute in the context of
the Deep South, and is also clearly present in Guantanamo today,
where a typical detainee is powerless, thousands of miles from his
home, unclear of his whereabouts, and, most likely, not an English-
language speaker. For that and other reasons, Professors Posner
and Vermeule's attempt to articulate a standard that finds a "mid-
dle ground" must be rejected. Coercive interrogation must be
treated differently.
B. Torture
The topic of torture has been extensively critiqued, discussed,
and analyzed. 15  This article is not intended to focus on the torture
152. See Where are 7rrorists to be Tried, supra note 9.
153. Frank Rich, Saving Private England, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, at AR1.
154. See Laura Hoffman Roppe, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery
and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 758 (1994); William T. Pizzi &
Morris B. Hoffman, TakingMiranda's Pulse, 58 VAND. L. REv. 813, 819 (2005).
155. See generally Joshua A. Decker, Is the United States Bound by the Customary International
Law of Torture? A Proposal for ATS Litigation in the War on 7rror, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 803 (2006)
(discussing whether the Bush Administration can legally deny the unlawful combatants of al
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debate. Nevertheless, any discussion of developing interrogation
standards for detainees must consider torture. It is this Article's
position that torture is unequivocally illegal, immoral, and does
not lead to actionable intelligence. 56 Nevertheless, others have
taken the opposite position, and in an effort to establish the pa-
rameters of detainee interrogation the Article will briefly discuss
such views.
Torture is defined by the 1984 Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as:
[A] ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information or
a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, or in-
timidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.1
7
Qaeda and the Taliban international humanitarian law protections); Jeffery C. Goldman,
Treaties and Torture: How the Supreme Court Can Restrain the Executive, 55 DUKE L.J. 609 (2005)
(arguing that the Supreme Court should take a far more activist approach in reviewing ex-
ecutive interpretation of international law and that it may do so while remaining consistent
with judicial precedent); Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism
and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481 (2004) (arguing that supporting an absolute
ban on torture, rather than a qualified prohibition, is the appropriate legal position from
both a moral and pragmatic viewpoint, but that there should be exceptions during truly
catastrophic times); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment". The Ban on
Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEx. L. REv. 2013 (2003); David Luban, Liberalism, Tor-
ture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425 (2005) (examining the place of torture
within liberalism); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power:
Interrogation, Detention, and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255 (2006) (arguing that the most effective
power-checking tools have emerged from the military and intelligence community, the me-
dia, non-governmental organizations, and the courts); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive
law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681 (2005) (discussing that the
absolute prohibition on torture should remain in force and that any attempt to loosen it
would deal a traumatic blow to our legal system); Steve Chapman, Unconscionable Torture
Tactics: Will the Next CIA Director Have the Courage to Swear Off Waterboarding? CHI. TRIB., May
11, 2006, at 25; Next CIA Chief Must Forswear Torture Tactics, BALT. SUN, May 15, 2006, at 11A;
Carol Rosenberg, U.S.: Block Any Evidence Obtained Via Torture, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 24,
2006, at A12; Frances Williams, Washington to Defend Record on Torture Before UN, FT.coM, May
4, 2006, http://search.ft.com/ftArticle?id=060504008510.
156. See Guiora & Page, supra note 7.
157. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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Additionally, the European Commission of Human Rights has
stated that:
[T]he notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or
physical. Further, treatment of an individual may be said to be
degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives
him to act against his own will or conscience.
5 s
Lastly, in the widely cited Cleveland Principles, torture is suc-
cinctly defined as "any cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.0
5
1
In defense of torture, consider the arguments of Bagaric and
Clarke, who speculate that torture may be acceptable in certain
conditions:
The only situation where torture is justifiable is where it is
used as an information gathering technique to avert a grave
risk. In such circumstances, there are five variables relevant in
determining whether torture is permissible and the degree of
torture that is appropriate. The variables are (1) the number
of lives at risk; (2) the immediacy of the harm; (3) the avail-
ability of other means to acquire the information; (4) the
level of wrongdoing of the agent; and (5) the likelihood that
the agent actually does possess the relevant information.
Where (1), (2), (4) and (5) rate highly and (3) is low, all
forms of harm may be inflicted on the agent-even if this re-
sults in death.lw
Other scholars, however, have found a fundamental problem
with the "end product" of torture. 6 Whether it is termed "action-
able intelligence," 62 or "bad information and false confessions," 63
experience has shown that information received from a tortured
detainee is overwhelmingly inaccurate, unreliable, and of minimal
158. Nan D. Miller, Comment, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary
Confinement in the United States a Violation of International Standards, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139,
150 (1995).
159. See Frederick K. Cox Int'l Law Ctr., Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, The Cleve-
land Principles of International Law on the Detention & Treatment of Persons in
Connection with "the Global War on Terror," http://www.law.case.edu/centers/cox/
content.asp?contentid=85 (last visited Oct. 27, 2007) (emanating from the "Torture and
the War on Terror" conference held at Case Western School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio on
October 7, 2005).
160. Bagaric &Clarke, supra note 7, at 611.
161. See Rumney, supra note 7.
162. Guiora & Page, supra note 7, at 428.
163. Rumney, supra note 7, at 495.
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value in preventing acts of terrorism. Further, torture ought to be
pragmatically avoided, as intelligence gained through torture may
damage the overall investigatory process. Douglas A. Johnson, ex-
ecutive director of the Center for Victims of Torture, claimed that
arguing for the necessity of torture rests on "unproven assumptions
based on anecdotes from agencies with little transparency":
Well-trained interrogators, within the military, the FBI, and
the police have testified that torture does not work, is unreli-
able and distracting from the hard work of interrogation.
Nearly every client at the Center for Victims of Torture, when
subjected to torture, confessed to a crime they did not com-
mit, gave up extraneous information, or supplied names of
innocent friends or colleagues to their torturers. It is a great
source of shame for our clients, who tell us they would have
said anything their tormentors wanted them to say in order to
get the pain to stop. Such extraneous information distracts,
rather than supports, valid investigations.'
The current allegations of improper treatment of detainees
strongly suggests that allowing coercive techniques 65 has led to se-
rious abuses bordering on torture, as described in the testimony of
a former military interrogator in Afghanistan, Chris Mackey:
When we arrived in Afghanistan, I had an unshakable convic-
tion that we should follow the rules to the letter: no physical
touching, no stress positions, no "dagger on the table" threats,
and no deprivation of sleep ... but I knew that it was possible
to make bad decisions in the heat of the moment, that it was
easy for emotions to overwhelm good judgment. Following
the rules to the letter was the safe route. Even entertaining
the idea of doing otherwise was inviting "slippage." 6
Even if moderate safeguards against torture are instituted 67 it is
all but inevitable that some interrogator will "misunderstand,"
"misinterpret," or be classified as a "bad apple who does not repre-
sent the American military."68 Especially in the realm of torture,
164. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R? Gonzales to be Attorney General of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 522 (2005) (testi-
mony of Douglas A. Johnson, Executive Director, Center for Victims of Torture).
165. See NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 54 (detail-
ing types of coercive techniques permitted by the Bush Administration).
166. Rumney, supra note 7, at 504-05.
167. See Dershowitz, supra note 7.
168. See Editorial, Mr. Rumsfeld's Defense, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2004, atA16.
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unclear or evasive guidelines lend themselves too easily to misin-
terpretation with devastating consequences. This truth is
particularly important when noting that the most recent legislative
response, the Military Commissions Act of 2001,169 stops short of
clearly and specifically delineating permissible and impermissible
actions. Because torture, however it is phrased, spun, or articu-
lated, is illegal, the United States is in great need of clear and
concise standards in the context of torture so that interrogators are
not pushed down a dangerous slippery slope and do not commit
abuses.
V. THREATS AND CUMULATIVE MISTREATMENT
To determine which criminal law standards should apply to in-
terrogations in the hybrid paradigm by examining the historical
example of the Deep South, threats and cumulative mistreatment
are particularly relevant as both have long been mainstays of inter-
rogations and have been the subject of to critique and analysis for
many years.
In the interrogation context, the primary danger in permitting
interrogators to threaten a detainee or subject him or her to cumu-
lative mistreatment is the risk of eliciting an involuntary and false
confession. Thus, threats and cumulative mistreatment must first
be defined specifically so interrogators are aware of actions that
risk eliciting false statements. Then, the permissibility of threats or
cumulative mistreatment should be determined based on the vol-
untariness of the confession they illicit.
A. Defining a Threat
Historically, case examples demonstrate that threats can take
many forms, including threatening a suspect with harm to his rela-
tives, moving him from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, turning the
suspect over to an angry mob, or intimating to the suspect that he
will be physically harmed unless he confesses.Y°
Whether specific language amounts to a threat or not will de-
pend on the circumstances. In making this determination, a court
employs a "totality of circumstances" test to decide whether, as a
result of the conduct alleged to be a threat, the accused's will was
169. Military Commissions Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
170. See supra Part II.C. (discussing Brown, Ward, and White).
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overborne at the time he confessed. 7 ' To find a threat, a court
must assess both the interrogator's practices and the suspect's indi-
vidual characteristics. 172 If the threat is of a violent nature, a
subsequent confession is per se invalid. 7 3 These generalities aside,
examining relevant jurisprudence leads to the conclusion that
threats are neither definitively nor consistently defined. 74 For the
purposes of this Article, however, threats are defined as interroga-
tion methods inducing a suspect to provide his interrogator(s) with
information when under the impression that to do otherwise will
result in penalty either to himself or to others. As noted earlier, the
interrogation room is a place of inherent inequality where the state
possesses both the resources and a powerful position, so the inter-
rogation "battle" can never be a fair fight. The question, then, is
whether an interrogator's actions increased this inherently threat-
ening situation to impose undue force on the individual to confess.
Applying this criminal law principle to the hybrid paradigm, the
focus returns to the "voluntariness" test to determine whether the
confession was freely given.
B. Threats and Inadmissible Confessions-the "Voluntariness Test"
Under traditional criminal law, a confession resulting from a legal
threat may be used, but that confession becomes inadmissible if it is
deemed involuntary.175 Voluntariness is the critical variable in deter-
mining admissibility. In the detainee context, adoption of the hybrid
paradigm could obviate much of this confusion because strict crimi-
nal law precedent would not have to be followed, so policy-makers
could create a new, clear system with less discretion allowed in de-
termining voluntariness. 76
To identify whether a confession is voluntary when given after a
threat, this Article suggests the use of the following spectrum. At
one extreme is the implied or direct threat to a family member,
177
immediately adjacent are threats comparable to those directed to-
171. 23 C.J.S. CiminalLaw§ 1252 (2007).
172. See Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99
MICH. L. REv. 1211 (2001).
173. See id.
174. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 156 (1953); United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Frazier v. State,
107 So. 2d 16 (Fa. 1958); Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225 (1852); State v. Bernard, 106 So. 656
(La. 1925).
175. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943).
176. See Quirin to Havdan, supra note 9.
177. Those of the Islamic tradition are extraordinarily sensitive to such threats.
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wards African Americans in the Deep South and denounced by the
Supreme Court,"" and at the other extreme are legitimate threats
such as the mention of possible prison sentence for obstructing
justice. Professor Fred Inbau offers further insight on delineating
lawful threats:
Advising or imploring a subject to "tell the truth" is never
considered objectionable. Some difficulties occasionally arise,
however, when the interrogator uses such language as "it
would be better for you to confess," "you had better confess,"
"it would be better for you to tell the truth," or "you had bet-
ter tell the truth."
A number of courts have held that such statements as "you
had better confess" or "it would be better for you to confess"
constitute threats or promises which will nullify a confession;
and some courts have gone so far as to hold that the same
rule applies even when the suspect is told "it would be better
to tell (or you had better tell) the truth."'
1 79
As a brief note, one might interject a concern that application of
restrictive criminal law principles to detainee interrogations will
handicap interrogators and jeopardize national security. However,
this Article argues that if society has determined that police can
effectively investigate murders and rapes under a set of standards
that do not allow for certain harsh interrogation methods, then
interrogators of detainees should be able to conduct their interro-
gations in a similar fashion. In addition, some threats made to
detainees are disturbingly similar to threats used against African
Americans in the Deep South,80 and as the Supreme Court's limit-
ing of interrogation methods was a valid response to abuses
suffered by African Americans, so limiting the conduct of interro-
gators in the detainee context is similarly appropriate.
The application of criminal law principles regarding threats and
voluntary confessions explicitly rejects the views espoused in the By-
bee memos. 8' This rejection is the essence of this Article's theory.
Mild threats, such as those implicit in any interrogation setting or
those that merely notify the defendant of the possible consequences
178. See supra Part II.
179. See FRED E. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION 170 (1948).
180. See Human Rights Watch, Table of Interrogation Techniques Recom-
mended/Approved by U.S. Officials (Aug. 2004), http://hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/
0819interrogation.htm.
181. See supra note 6.
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awaiting him, easily fall within constitutionally permissible methods
under criminal law jurisprudence. Supreme Court precedent,
however, has unequivocally instructed law enforcement officials
regarding the "limits of power" with respect to threats that result in
involuntary confessions. In extrapolating from the criminal law
paradigm, the same voluntariness test should apply to the detainee
interrogation context.
C. Defining Cumulative Mistreatment
While courts and scholars have discussed and defined threats in
the context of the interrogation setting, the same cannot be said
for "cumulative mistreatment." Bringing together definitions from
other scholars, courts, and policy-makers, this Article defines "cu-
mulative mistreatment" as any "prolonged interrogation
incorporating illegal methods resulting in an involuntary confes-
sion." Generally, cumulative mistreatment is found by a court's
determination that the continuousness and cumulativeness of the
interrogation was the specific factor which broke down a suspect's
will.
D. Voluntariness is Again the Standard
To determine appropriate limits for cumulative mistreatment,
the need to ensure a voluntary confession is once again para-
mount, and an involuntary confession is inadmissible. 18 2 The facts
in McNabb v. United States 83 are illustrative. In McNabb, the defen-
dants were questioned while in custody, but before appearing in
front of a magistrate, in violation of the law at the time. Despite the
fact that such actions may have been excusable if carried out over a
short time, the lengthy questioning concerned the Court:
Throughout the questioning.., at least six officers were pre-
sent. At no time during its course was a lawyer or any relative
or friend of the defendants present. Taylor began by telling
"each of them before they were questioned that we were Gov-
ernment officers, what we were investigating, and advised
them that they did not have to make a statement, that they
need not fear force, and that any statement made by them
182. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (reversing a conviction under simi-
lar circumstances).
183. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 336 (1943).
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would be used against them, and that they need not answer
any questions asked unless they desired to do so."
8 4
Similar cumulative mistreatment in the detainee interrogation
context is also unconstitutional. Thus, once again, the voluntari-
ness test as articulated by the Court in McNabb s5 is the appropriate
standard to use to determine cumulative mistreatment in the hy-
brid paradigm:
[I]n their treatment of the petitioners the arresting officers
assumed functions which Congress has explicitly denied
them. They subjected the accused to the pressures of a proce-
dure which is wholly incompatible with the vital but very
restricted duties of the investigating and arresting officers of
the Government and which tends to undermine the integrity
of the criminal proceeding.
6
After McNabb, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of cumula-
tive mistreatment in Upshaw v. United States.'" The Court ruled
Upshaw's confession coerced and inadmissible, reasoning that
"[w] here confessions were made during a thirty hour period while
accused was held a prisoner after police had arrested him on suspi-
cion and without a warrant and the delay was for the purpose of
furnishing an opportunity for further interrogation, the confes-
sions were inadmissible."'88 As both Upshaw and McNabb indicate,
whether a detainee's interrogation is tantamount to cumulative
mistreatment should be determined under a broad standard where
the deciding factor is whether such treatment overcame the de-
tainee's will.
E. Threats and Cumulative Mistreatment in the Detainee Context
There is little doubt that aspects of current detainee interroga-
tions violate the established rules governing both threats and
cumulative mistreatment. As indicated by Amnesty International,
184. Id. at 336.
185. Id. at 341-42. ("While the connotation of voluntary is indefinite, it affords an un-
derstandable label under which can be readily classified the various acts of terrorism,
promises, trickery, and threats which have led this and other courts to refuse admission as
evidence to confessions.").
186. Id. at 342.
187. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); see also Anderson v. United States,
318 U.S. 350 (1943).
188. Upshaw, 335 U.S. at 414.
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"[t] he very conditions in which the detainees are held-harsh, iso-
lating and indefinite-can in themselves amount to torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."'89 The Amnesty report
goes on to assert that interrogation teams employ such tactics as
lengthy and cumulative questioning, sleep deprivation, stress posi-
tions, isolation, hooding, sensory deprivation, and the use of dogs
to induce fear.'90 Lastly, while cumulative mistreatment may not ini-
tially seem as damaging as more tangible physical threats, the
Supreme Court has held that cumulative mistreatment is as viola-
tive of a defendant's constitutional rights as threats.'9 '
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as analyzed and ex-
tended by the Supreme Court in the precedent cases discussed in
this Article, speak loudly and clearly. The right against self-
incrimination and the right to due process in the criminal law
paradigm have been affirmed and reiterated by the Supreme
Court. The Court has made clear that coercive interrogations, tor-
ture, threats, and cumulative mistreatment violate both of these
seminal amendments in the context of interrogations. These prin-
ciples, oudined in criminal law jurisprudence, must now be
extended to remedy the abuses found in modern detainee interro-
gations.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In sum, this Article aspires to address two fundamental con-
cerns: first to protect interrogators from prosecution by their own
government, and second to ensure that constitutional guarantees
are honored. Unquestionably, unrestrained coercive interrogation
and torture comport with neither the values of civil society nor the
norms of the international community. Thus, the requisite next
step for the United States government is to establish clearly deline-
ated rules and standards to prevent coercive interrogation. These
standards must reflect a balance between the interest of the United
189. Amnesty Int'l, Guantanamo: An Icon of Lawlessness (Jan. 6, 2005), http://web.
amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510022005.
190. Id.
191. See supra Part V. For examples of cumulative mistreatment in this Article, see
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 334 (1943) (holding a defendant for a number of days
prior to bringing him before a judge), Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 548-549 (1942) (re-
peated transfer from county to county without sleep), White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532
(1940) (continued whipping of suspect in the woods), Brown v. United States, 297 U.S. 278,
280 (1935) (beatings imposed on a suspect over the course of a number of days), and Zing
Sung Wan v. United States, 226 U.S. 1 (1924) (holding a suspect in a hotel for a number of
days for the purposes of intermittent interrogation).
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States in national security and the equally valid interest of an indi-
vidual in his or her personal autonomy.
The government has many different places to look for examples
of how to establish effective standards and guidelines for interroga-
tions. From the domestic standpoint, the government can draw
upon the traditional criminal law paradigm and the extensive pro-
cedures already established for interrogations, as well as the
Supreme Court's historical response to mistreatment of African
Americans in the Deep South. Using the hybrid model comprised
of aspects from both criminal law and prisoner of war paradigms,
and reflecting on historical analogy, the government has a unique
opportunity to formulate concrete policy recommendations rooted
in the law. The suggestions outlined below are examples of conclu-
sions that might be drawn from the ideas articulated throughout
this Article.
Recommendation 1: Detainees, even if not American citizens,
are to be granted basic constitutional protections.
Recommendation 2: Torture as an interrogation method is ille-
gal and the so-called "ticking time bomb" exception is not to
be condoned or adopted.
Recommendation 3: The "void for vagueness" doctrine is appli-
cable in determining the limits of coercive interrogation, and
instituted policy must be clear and particular in its standards.
Recommendation 4: Both the law and the spirit of Hamdan are
to be applied when determining the limits of interrogation.
Recommendation 5: The Brain-Brown progeny, as discussed in
this Article, articulates clear guidelines with respect to the lim-
its of interrogation where neither coercive interrogation,
threats, nor cumulative mistreatment can be permitted.
Recommendation 6: The process of extending constitutional
guarantees to the detainees can and should draw from the
Supreme Court's extension of constitutional rights in re-
sponse to the African American experience in the Deep
South.
Recommendation 7: Coercive interrogation parameters must be
clearly established to specifically articulate what methods are
acceptable, and acceptable measures should be limited to a)
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the use of uncomfortable chairs, b) room temperature modi-
fication, c) sleep deprivation, d) loud music, and e) the use of
hoods.
Recommendation 8: Interrogation of detainees without protect-
ing the detainees' rights with respect to self-incrimination and
due process violates the Constitution.
Recommendation 9 The United States Supreme Court must en-
gage in active judicial review of an otherwise unfettered
executive regarding the interrogation methods used.
Most importantly, clear and unequivocal guidelines and stan-
dards must be promulgated by the government and provided to
interrogators. In order to avoid the mistakes of the past, the
United States must learn from the relevant lessons that history pro-
vides. The interrogation cells of the Deep South are applicable to
the interrogation cells of Guantanamo Bay. The Bram-Brown prog-
eny provides the most effective lesson that history can offer for the
armed conflict in which America presently finds herself, and the
nation would do well to learn.
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